We have three scenario plans ranging from "minor revisions, agreement extended" to "full breakdown, tariffs on everything from Canada and Mexico." I wish I could say they were equally weighted internally. They are not. The comfortable scenario gets the most attention because nobody wants to present the scary one to the board.

The 75% regional value content requirement is already painful for some of our platforms. If they push it to 80 or 85 we are talking about meaningful sourcing changes that cannot happen in a year. The suppliers who would benefit from that shift don't have capacity. This isn't a policy decision in a vacuum, it affects physical production.

To actually answer your question: yes, some OEMs are running contingency scenarios and no, most of them are not sharing the outputs with supply chain teams below a certain level. We have three modeled outcomes internally. Status quo with minor threshold adjustments, meaningful RVC tightening to something in the 80 percent range, and a full renegotiation that reopens labor value content and steel and aluminum provisions simultaneously. The third scenario is the one nobody wants to talk about because the operational response to it involves sourcing decisions that would take 18 to 24 months to execute and we do not have 18 to 24 months before July 1st. What that means practically is that the contingency planning exists on paper but the actions required to actually prepare for the worst case are not happening because taking them would be disruptive and leadership is betting on a more moderate outcome.

We ran a formal USMCA scenario exercise about eight months ago. Three scenarios: status quo renewal, tightened RVC requirements to 80 percent, and a breakdown with MFN tariffs applying across the board. The honest output of that exercise was that scenario two was survivable with 18 to 24 months of transition pain and about a dozen supplier relationships that would need to be rebuilt domestically. Scenario three was not survivable at current margins without significant price increases or production shifts that our capital plan does not support. What surprised leadership was how little flexibility actually existed in the supply base. A lot of the nearshoring that got announced publicly in 2022 and 2023 is still in process or was quietly scaled back. The exercise was useful but it also made clear that the gap between our contingency plans and our actual sourcing reality is wider than anyone wanted to admit out loud.